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Comments

Historical Perspective of the "Sex
Psychopath" Statute: From the
Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal

Crime Bill

I. INTRODUCTION
As an historical analysis, this comment begins with a background of
the American criminal process from the pre- and post-Revolutionary
eras. Along the way, a transformation regarding the views of criminal
law and criminals took place. By means of this historical background,
the comment further analyzes how the shifting notions during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are reflected in modem day sex
offender legislation.
The comment traces the first "sex psychopath" statute in 1930s'
Michigan to the recent federal crime bill that includes legislation for
"sexually violent predators." Although the comment reviews the legal
significance of the enactment of sex offender legislation, it also makes
note of the recurring theme regarding the emergence of these efforts:
The public expresses outrage over brutal crimes sensationalized in the
media. Then, legislators and interested groups respond with tailored
legislation addressing the cycle of fear sex offenders cause.
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The comment ends with a discussion of the recently enacted federal
crime bill, which includes a provision for sexually violent predators. The
crime bill's language is reminiscent of the first "sexually violent
predators" statute enacted in Washington State in 1989.
II. HISTORY
Under English common law, ecclesiastical courts originally exercised
a wide jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to morals and the
family.'
These courts-also called "Courts Christian"-assumed
jurisdiction with the hope of amelioration in contrast to the harsher
penalties exacted under the general criminal jurisdiction.' In addition
to offenses specifically punishable at common law, the church claimed
authority over acts involving sex.'
During the sixteenth century, however, the upper social classes in
England developed an administrative approach for themselves by way
of the Court of High Commission.' From 1558 to 1640, the Court of
High Commission dealt with unusual sexual and family practices.'
"Persons committing acts such as adultery, incest, bigamy, immorality,
assault with intent to ravish, swearing desperate oaths, and blasphemy
were handled by... [both] the system of ecclesiastical courts and the
High Commission.'
Yet, by the peak of Puritan ascendancy and the English Civil War in
the mid-1600s, which led to the abolition of the English monarchy, both
bodies had fallen into disuse.7 As a result, either by creation of specific
statutes or common law assumption of general jurisdiction, the common
law courts took charge of offenses within the domain of marital and
sexual aberration: During the sixteenth century reign of Henry VIII, a
specific statute was created to deal with "unnatural offenses." Bigamy
became a crime in 1603, viewed as behavior in need of legal regulation.
Divorces no longer were within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts when special "divorce courts" were created in 1857." "Over the
last century in England, various sexual offenses acts were enacted based

1. GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW, PSYCHIATRY & SEX
PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30'S TO THE 80'S 831, 845 (1977).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 846.
Id.
Id.
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on different aims that were often in conflict, such as prohibiting sexual
acts believed immoral by way of the criminal law even though the
utilitarian
goal of preventing demonstrable harm was not in ques10
tion."
A. Shift in Function of American CriminalProcess
The focus on the shifting notions of the Anglo-American criminal
process during the pre- and post-Revolutionary eras is valuable because
it gives perspective to recent efforts to control sexually deviant behavior.
Colonial Massachusetts is an illustration of the transformation of
American criminal law during the pre- and post-Revolutionary eras."
In early colonial days continuing through the late eighteenth century,
Puritan criminal law was heavily infused with Mosaic law. 12 Sin and
crime were equated, and the sinner was a criminal. Criminal law was
the application of the law of God. No separate ecclesiastical courts were
required because religious notions involving sex were incorporated into
the application of the civil law. The primary goal of criminal law,
therefore, was the enforcement of the people's religious morality."
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, American
criminal law transformed significantly. The common pre-Revolutionary
notion of the function of criminal law was to enforce the morals and
religions of the American people.' 4
After the war, however, the
predominant view was that the purpose of criminal law was to protect
property and physical security. 5 This ideology reflected the contrasting function of the criminal process. In addition, the role of government
in criminal cases, "from passive arbiter of contests between private
citizens to active advocate of public order,"' shifted accordingly.
1. Criminal Law During Seventeenth Century and PreRevolutionary Era: Prosecutions for Immorality and Crime as
Sin. In the 1600s, there was initially a hesitancy to inflict punishment
for sex offenders without scriptural authority.' However, in the "Body

10. Id.
11. The study primarily depended upon for the historical study of the American legal
thought during the Revolutionary era was limited to the trial court records of Middlesex
County, Massachusetts. William E. Nelson, EmergingNotions of Modern Criminal Law
in Revolutionary Era: An HistoricalPerspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 450 (1967).
12. Id. at 450-51.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 451.
16. Id. at 450.
17. PSYCHIATRY & SEX, supra note 1, at S49.
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of Liberties" of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, although rape was not
originally a capital offense, by 1648 it had become one such offense.'
Rape was the only capital offense listed without a Biblical citation to
justify the punishment. Adultery with a married woman was a capital
crime for both parties." Sexual intercourse between a married man
and a single unbetrothed woman, however, was considered no more than
fornication. 20
A.D. 1285 concluded the culmination of the unfolding history of the
treatment of rape in English law. Codified English law defined rape as
a felony punishable by death.2' Little has changed since then, and this
precedent was eventually brought to America. In colonial America, rape
was punishable by death once scriptural authority was ignored.'
Originally, the most severe penalty short of death was ordered when
the victim was a minor: The penalty may have consisted of the
maximum number of lashings permitted, slitting the offender's nostrils,
or condemning him never to appear in public thereafter without a halter
about his neck.' Aggravated rape offenders usually were required to
continue wearing a rope around the neck." Although statutes were
enacted authorizing punishment by death for statutory rape, in practice,
the lives of most transgressors were spared.F
Criminal law of the pre-Revolutionary era "included offenses against
God and religion, offenses against government, offenses against public
justice, offenses against public trade and health, homicide, offenses
against the person, and offenses against habitations and other private
property".2 According to research concentrating on the court records
of colonial Massachusetts Middlesex county between 1760 and 1774,
most cases were within the category of offenses against God and
religion." The majority of cases were for fornication, defined as sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman not married to one another.'
Fornication was in fact punished because it offended God, not merely
because mothers of illegitimate children burdened the communities with
the need for economic support for the children. A man found guilty of

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 851.

23. Id.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Nelson, supra note 11, at 452.
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 452.
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fornication was required to give a bond to the town as a guarantee of his
support for the child; thus, economic interests were involved.'
However, "prosecutions were brought even when no economic interests
were at stake, and the same penalties were imposed in those prosecutions as in cases where economic interests may have played a part.' °
Therefore, a woman accused of fornication was punished because her
offense against God was the essential evil."1
Related to the typical view of crime between 1760 and 1774 was the
view of the criminal: an ordinary member of society who had sinned."
Thus, "[like sin, crime could strike in any man's family or among any
man's neighbors."' Court records during this era indicated a convicted
criminal was not segregated from the rest of society and placed in
prison-penalties were not imposed to sever a criminal's ties with
society." The normal punishment imposed for a long duration-the
sale into servitude of a convicted thief unable to pay treble damages-affected a criminal, not by segregating him, but by integrating him
more fully into society by reorienting him toward normal social
contacts.3
Although the first decade of the Revolution produced no change in
prosecutions regarding a fornication offense, the General Court in
17 8 6 enacted a statute that codified punishment for fornication. 7
The fornication statute permitted a woman guilty of the crime to confess
her guilt before a justice of the peace, pay an appropriate fine, and
thereby avoid prosecution by way of indictment .... I This resulted
in a significant decline until 1791, when women stopped confessing, as
they were aware that even though they did not confess they would not
be indicted.' As a result, the law's attitude toward adultery changed.

29. Id. at 453 & n.11.
30. Id. at 453.
31. Id Not all of the recorded cases of colonial Massachusetts related to God and
religion. Approximately 14% of the total offenses before Middlesex County included larceny
prosecutions and prosecutions for burglary and breaking and entering. These offenses
against property adhered to the traditional view of crime as sin against God, which
government was obligated to suppress. Id. at 453-54.
32. Id. at 454.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 455.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 455 n.28 (citing An Act for the Punishment of Fornication, and for the
Maintenance of Bastard Children, MASS. ACTS & LAWS 1785, ch. 66 (enacted March 15,
1786)).
37. I at 455.
38. Id. at 455-56.
39. Id. at 456.
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By 1793, though divorces for adultery were regular occurrences, prosecuto publicly acknowltions disappeared.'4 Thus, the courts were able
41
it.
prosecuting
without
sin
of
existence
the
edge
According to religious leaders of the times, the deemphasis of
prosecution for sin was related to a deterioration in morals."2 They
traced the reasons to the Revolution, where " profaneness of language,
drunkenness, gambling, and lewdness were exceedingly increased."'
In addition, morality's deemphasis was traced to social vice and
illegitimacy. A modern author, however, does not trace the late
eighteenth century's change as to a "'deep-seated coarseness or general
immorality."'" Rather, what occurred during the transition period of
the pre-Revolutionary era to the Revolution was a relaxation of social
customs or public morality.'
2. Criminal Law During Post-Revolutionary Era: Prosecutions
for Safety of Society. A gradual increase of prosecutions for offenses
against habitations and private property occurred after the Revolution.
Although a return of prosperity in the 1790's dropped the number of
offenses and remained constant until 1806, there was again an increase
in crimes against property through 1810.' Evidence suggests economic
distress apparently caused the increasing numbers of crimes against
property during the post-Revolutionary era.'
With the gradual emergence of crimes against property came the
emergence of hard labor as a punishment, replacing the imposition of
penalties used in the pre-Revolutionary era.' In 1785, for example, the
Massachusetts legislature provided for the imprisonment of thieves at
hard labor. The state expected the proceeds of such labor would pay the
costs of imprisoning those so punished.' 9 Meanwhile, a movement for
general reform for prison management and criminal rehabilitation
emerged, and by 1805 it was at its height in Middlesex County; state

40.

Id. at 457.

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 457-58 (quoting T. Dwight, A Discourse on Some Events of the Last Century,
delivered January 7, 1801, quoted in V. Stauffer, New England and the Bavarian
Illuminati,82 COLUM. U. STUDIES INHIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 25 (1918)).
44. Id. at 458 (quoting V. Stauffer, New England and the Bavasian Illuminati, 83
COLum. U. STUDIES IN HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 25 (1918)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 458-59.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 460.
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prisons were reopened, and corporal punishment was imposed for the
last time."
The decline in prosecutions for offenses against God and religion, the
increase in prosecutions for offenses against habitations and private
property, and the use of hard labor as punishment transformed legal and
social attitudes toward crime and the criminal."' By 1810, the view of
sin equating crime, and that prosecutions were for immorality had
vanished. 2 By 1810, crimes were prosecuted to "'insure the peace and
safety of society' and to relieve the public from the depredations of
In 1810, "more than fifty percent of all
notorious offenders . ...
prosecutions were for theft, and only one-half of one percent for conduct
offensive to morality."' In 1810, the criminal was one who preyed
upon his fellow citizens.'
By the early 1780s there was an emergence of a new concern with
political and economic disorder.' "[Mien came to view criminal law as
having a dual function, 'to discourage (both) vice and disorders in
society.'1 7 During this decade, a number of attacks upon authority and
property occurred. The lower class culminated in open rebellion. Years
of violence supported the upper class fear of the lower class attacking
their wealth and standing." '
The increase in the incidence of theft contributed to both a strengthening and a modification of the upper class fear.5 The security of person
and property was at stake. Members of the lower classes used a variety
of techniques to disrupt this security. The lower classes "rioted; they
attacked courts and tax collectors; they refused to pay debts; they
entered men's homes and carried away their possessions.'
The actions of the lower classes could be reduced to two types: There
were those who broke the law and infringed property rights directly, like
thieves. In addition, there were those who worked indirectly by
destroying the institutions of government upon which law enforcement,

50. Id, at 461.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 462.
53. Id. at 461-62.
54. Id. at 462.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 463.
57. Id. at 464 (quoting Draft of Grand Jury Charge by Cushing, C.J., 1783, in William
Cushing Papers 21).
58. Id at 464-65.
59. 1d at 465.
60. Id.
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and security of property rights, rested.61 In the late eighteenth
century, thus, criminal law primarily functioned first, to punish and
deter direct attacks on property. Second, criminal law must preserve the
power of government to perform the first function. 2
Indeed, the theoretic, pre-Revolutionary view of crime was dying
rapidly. When men rejected the old religious traditions, they also
rejected many of the old moral ones. Among the old religious traditions
was the unquestioned assumption that government should enforce
morality.' "Such men.., were taking a step toward a modern view of
criminal law-a view that its purpose [was] to protect men from
unwanted invasions of their rights.'
Those faithful to old religious
traditions, like clergymen, abandoned the idea of theocracy. "[1It became
'evident that the salvation of the nation had to be won with no assistance from any civil authority."
The end result was criminal law became temporal and secularized.
Criminal law's purpose became seen not as the preservation of morality,
but rather as the protection of social order. Meanwhile, the criminal
was an outcast of society.6 Prior to the Revolution, all types of men
became involved in crime. By 1810, however, the upper classes rarely
became involved in criminal law." The poverty of most criminals
isolated them from the better elements of society on whom they preyed.
Criminals in 1810, unlike the sinners of old, were in fact different from
other men.6
In the early nineteenth century, long terms of imprisonment did not
reform men and enable them to take their place in society. Rather,
imprisonment "confirmed them in their criminal ways by giving them an
opportunity Tor corrupting one another."' By 1810, the criminal kept
returning to crime and was forever condemned from the peace and
prosperity of the society he challenged.
During the nineteenth century, the rape of a woman or carnal
knowledge of a child under age ten continued to be punishable by

61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 465-66 (quoting P. MUaER FROM THE COVENANT To THE REVIVAL, 1 RELIGION
IN AMERICAN LIFE 322, 356 (Smith & Jamison eds. 1961)).

66. Id. at 466.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting G. BRADFORD, STATE PRISONS AND THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM
VINDICATED 5, 51 (1821)).
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death.70 Sodomy and bestiality were viewed as behavior "contrary to
the light of nature," again relying upon the Biblical injunction that
"mankinde lyeth with mankinde."7 ' These offenses were punishable by
death unless the perpetrator was under the age of fourteen. Nonetheless
by 1805, these acts had been removed from the list of capital offenses.72
These behaviors were not viewed as a reflection of a disturbed personality, but rather predatory behavior like other aggressive acts of taking
that the criminal law regulated. 73
3. Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Colonies varied in their
manner of dealing with sexual offenders. Throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, state laws emerged that superseded common
law practices and codified criminal behavior. These statutes included
classifications of sexual offenses as part of the criminal code. Sexual
behavior was not treated any differently from other acts defined as
criminal. Accordingly, disposition was made in the same manner as for
other criminal acts and was subject to the same available defenses.
Ill.

DISCUSSION OF THE BEGINNING OF SEX PSYCHOPATH
LEGISLATION

Late 1930s Through 1950s
In terms of dealing with sex offenders, the modern era was heralded
by the legislative approach of enacting special "sex psychopath" statutes
in the late 1930s.' 4 Fear of sexual crimes, particularly those having
violent overtones or involving children, often created the atmosphere for
the passage of such legislation."5 Michigan enacted the first sexual
psychopath statute in 1937. 71 Sex offenders deemed sexually dangerous
or sexual psychopaths were diverted from correctional processes under
the criminal justice system to rehabilitative treatment under the mental
health system.7 7 As a general rule, the sexual psychopath statutes
contemplated confinement in two instances: First, an offender was

A

70. PsYCHIATRY & SEX, supra note 1, at 851.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 853.
75. Id.
76. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 780.501 to .509 (Callaghan 1937). (Repealed by PA. 1966, No.
267, f 2, Eff. March 10, 1967; PA. 1968, No. 143, § 2, Eff. August 1, 1968).
77. Joseph F. Grabowski V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually DangerousPersons Act:
An Examination of a Statute in Need of a Change, 12 So. ILL. UNIv. L.J. 437 (1988).
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confined until full recovery. The other alternative confined the
psychopath until no longer considered a menace to others. Each statute
contained a special procedure for obtaining release upon such recov78
ery.
Before the first enactment of sex psychopath legislation, pessimism
about the deterrent effects of incapacitation in institutions for sexual
crimes per se yeilded to another source of pessimism. This equally deep
pessimism concerned the ineffectiveness or inadequacy of the type of
treatment provided, or the lack of treatment altogether, during the
period of confinement.79 Early optimism involved the effectiveness of
identifying and predicting just who would behave in a deviant or
dangerous manner." Intimately fused with the clinicians' belief in this
ability was the idea that treatments were available to cure and
rehabilitate the individuals identified."' Accordingly, administration
of the sexual psychopath statutes was geared to the objectives of
incapacitation, treatment, and prevention.
1. Catalysts of "Sex Psychopath" Legislation. To an extent, the
demands of the medical field, legal leaders, and civic groups served as
catalysts for passage in many states of sexual psychopath laws since its
1938 birth in Michigan. These groups were convinced sex crimes were
usually evidence of mental disorders that should be treated rather than
punished."2 The sexual psychopath laws were viewed as... "curative
and remedial means of treting the sexually deviated offender by way of
psychiatric approach, and the entire theme [of the legislation] was that
the individual should be committed to a [sitate [miental [hiospital where
he could receive psychiatric treatment."m
From its onset, sexual psychopath legislation established the
progressive precedent that mental illness was a condition, even if it did
not meet the criteria of the obsolete M'Naughten "right or wrong" rule
about insanity. This condition required special treatment somewhat
different from the customary penal law enforcement procedure.8" Thus,
many scientists, judges, law enforcement officers, and community groups

78. 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 352 (1967).
79.

PSYCHIATRY & SEX, supra note 1, at 853.

80. Id. at 853-54.
81. Id. at 854.
82. Frederick J. Hacker & Marcel Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act In Practice: A
CriticalDiscussion, 43 CAL. L. REV. 766 (1955).
83. Id. at 766 (quoting A. Edward Nichols, former Legal Advisor to the Department of
Mental Hygiene of California, unpublished address delivered at Norwalk State Hospital,
Norwalk, Cal., May 22, 1952).
84. Id.
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positively recognized introduction of this legislation as a major step in
rehabilitating mentally disordered offenders.
By the 1930s, the public became increasingly concerned with brutal
sex offenses as more sophisticated mass media publicized these crimes.
Thus, due to the acute sensitivity of the interests which they threatened,
since the 1930s, sex crimes have consistently provoked the most intense
public reaction.
Their [sex offense legislation] popularity must be attributed in the
main not to any foundation in fact for their adoption, but to the
exploitation of the peculiarly intense anxieties about sex crimes that
most people feel: the channels of publicity have been receptive mainly
to the rabidly distorted declarations of ill-informed, often hysterical
prophets of calamity.'
Indeed, one study focused on the legislative efforts of several states by
1950 to protect the public from sexual psychopaths." As evidenced in
the popular literature of the times, the sexual psychopath statutes
implicitly reflected the public's anxieties about sex crimes.87 The
propositions were: Between the 1930s and the 1950s, women and
children were in danger because. of the prevalence of serious sex
crimes.' The serious sex crimes were committed by sexual psychopaths, who were referred to as "creatures" in one magazine." Sexual
psychopaths had no control over their impulses. Therefore, they had a
mental defect that did not make them responsible for their behavior?0
Because of their inability to control their behavior, the sexual psychopath would continue to commit serious sex crimes throughout his life."1
In addition, the sexual psychopath could be identified before ever
committing a sex crime.' Releasing sex criminals after punishing
them was subjecting women and children to a potentially dangerous
situation. Therefore, society was failing in its duty to protect the

85. Michael B. Roche, Note, The Plightof the Sexual Psychopath:A LegislativeBlunder
and JudicialAcquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 527 n.2 (1966) (citing TAPPAN,
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 13 (1950)).
86. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. OF CRIM. L. &
CRmONOLOGY 542, 543 (1950).
87. The focus of Edwin H. Sutherland's article was to refute the propositions as either
false or questionable. Id. at 544.
88. Id. at 543-46.
89. Id. at 543, 546-47 (referring to DAVID G. WITTELS, What Can We Do About Sex
Crimesf SAT. EVE. POST, 221:30 ff., Dec. 11, 1948).
90. Id. at 544, 547-48.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 544, 548-54.
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public." The creation of laws was necessary to keep sexual psychopaths confined until an effective permanent cure of their mental
defect." Treating sexual psychopathy as a mental defect required the
diagnosis, treatment, and recommendation for release of a sexual
psychopath made exclusively by psychiatrists."
Thus, the public demanded more restrictive measures against sex
criminals. Ordinary legislation was insufficient to protect communities
from the perpetration and repetition of crimes by sex offenders." This
interest was frequently generated following instances where wellpublicized rapes or other notorious sex offenses committed by mentally
unstable individuals had occurred.9
a. Illinois' 1938 act: An illustrationof the times. In 1938, the Illinois
legislature created its first sexually dangerous persons act, in which
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, and not insane or
feebleminded, which mental disorder has existed for a period of not less
than one (1) year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition
hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses, are hereby declared to be criminal sexual
psychopathic persons."
The purpose of the act was to prevent persons suffering from mental
disorders, excluding legal insanity, from being punished for crimes
committed during periods of such suffering." The 1938 act provided
an adequate legal procedure from a criminal indictment but before the
criminal trial. The procedure involved the treatment of habitual sex
offenders, and their indefinite removal from society. Indeed, the
legislature employed the act to deal with sex offenders suffering from
neurotic disorders that made them potential menaces to society.1°
As evidenced, for example, by discussion of the 1938 Illinois act before
its passage, sex psychopath legislation appeared to have been regarded
as the means necessary to satisfy the "urgency" resulting from public
hysteria and sensationalism. Proposed and passed sex psychopath laws
were regarded as well-reasoned attempts by state legislatures simultaneously to protect the public from brutal sex crimes and rehabilitate the

93. Id. at 544.

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
Sexual
99.
100.

Id.
Hacker & Frym, supra note 82, at 767.
Grabowski, supra note 77, at 438.
Id.at 439 n.14 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 820 (1938), known as the Criminal
Psychopathic Persons Act).
Id. at 438.

Id.
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offender. In the 1930s, Illinois planned to introduce a crime bill related
to sex offenders at a special session of the legislature." 1
The object of the bill [was] to give to the prosecuting authorities the
power to lock those who might be expected to commit atrocious sex
crimes, before the victim is brutally assaulted or killed. The situation
which call[ed] for the measure [was] well advertised in the press.
Some believe[d] that [Illinois was] in a wave of such crimes. 102
2. Two-Tiered Objectives. Regardless of what served as the
catalyst for their creation (i.e. demands by medical and legal leaders,
frequency of sex crimes, growing public concern, or well publicized rapes
of women and children) sex psychopath statutes emphasized a recurring
two-tiered legislative objective: "(1) to protect society by sequestering
the sexual psychopath so long as he remains a menace to others and (2)
to subject him to treatment to the end that he might recover from his
State legislatures
psychopathic condition and be rehabilitated.""'
introduced their crime bills as "the appropriate measures... to protect
society more adequately from aggressive sexual offenders... [and] that
society as well as the individual [sex offender would] benefit."'"'
The basis of the states' authority for enacting sexual psychopath
statutes rested on both the police power of the state and the doctrine of
parens patriae.'5 Pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, 1 the states have authority to: "Mlake, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same."'
Indeed, justified as within a state's police power, a state "may ...
enact a new procedure both curative in purpose and rehabilitating in
objective, and which substitute[d] treatment and cure for punishment. " '08 Furthermore, the statute's enactment was justified if "...
one purpose of the legislation [was] the protection of the public from

101. Wm. Scott Stewart, Comment, Concerning Proposed Legislation for the
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 3 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 407 (1938).

102. Id
103. 24 A.L.R.2d at 350; Grabowski, supra note 77, at 438.
104. Roche, supra note 85, at 527 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173:1 (repl. vol. 1964)).
105. Id. at 528.
106. U.S. CONST. amend X.
107. Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215, 220 n.43 (1960) (citing Commissioner v. Alger, 61 Mass.(7
Cush.) 53, 85 (1851)).
108. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1256, 232 S.W.2d 897, 902 (1952).
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indecent advances or criminal attack by those whom the State ha[d] the
power to classify as mentally ill and the right to confine and attempt to
cure."' 9 Pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, the state had a
sovereign right and duty of guardianship as to persons found to be
criminal sexual psychopaths. These sexual psychopaths were dangerous
to the health, morals, and safety of a community's citizens, and also to
themselves.'"
Limits did exist, however, to the states' dual powers. "The constitutional guarantees of personal liberty [could not] be unreasonably or
arbitrarily invaded."" "Furthermore, statutes enacted as a result of
the police power must have [had] some actual and reasonable relation
to the maintenance and promotion of the public health and welfare."
This in fact must be the end sought."
3. Early Caselaw and Constitutional Objections. Although sex
psychopath statutes generally have been upheld as a valid exercise of
the states' police power and parens patriae, from the beginning their
constitutionality has been challenged. They have been challenged as
denying due process or equal protection; as placing an accused in double
jeopardy; and as being ex post facto or retrospective legislation.1 In
addition, the legislation has been constitutionally challenged as
providing for self-incrimination; as providing for cruel and unusual
punishment; and as depriving an accused of his right to a jury trial. 4
The statutes are held generally to be civil rather than criminal in
nature. The statutes are held to provide for civil commitment, not
punitive incarceration. Indeed, the various objections to their constitutionality usually have failed.

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Swanson, supra note 107, at 220.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., State ex ret. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Mim. 545, 287 N.W. 297
(1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942);
Ex Parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951); State ex reL. Sweezer v. Green,
360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950).
114. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297
(1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584,4 N.W.2d 18 (1942);
Ex Parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951); State ex ret. Sweezer v. Green,
360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950).
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B.

The Trend By The 1960s
By 1960, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia enacted some
version of a sexually dangerous person statute."n Thus, whereas every
state had a civil procedure for committing persons as mentally ill, the
smaller group of twenty-seven states had a second civil procedure for
committing persons charged with sexual offenses as "sexual psycho..
paths," "sexually dangerous," or other similar labels. The 1960s' trend
emphasized the treatment of sex offenders through involuntary 18civil
commitment procedures rather than punishment after conviction.'
1. Definitions Each statute generally defined a "psychopathic" sex
offender as a person who lacked the power to control his sexual impulses
or who had criminal propensities to commit sex offenses." 7 Pennsylvania and Tennessee, for example, added the requirement the sex offender
must be a physical threat to others."'
However, because of the
different definitions used to describe the condition of such a person, the

115. The states having such "sex psychopathic statutes were the following- Alabama
(ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 434-442 (Supp. 1956)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5500-

5522 & §§ 5600-5607 (West 1953)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-19-10 (Supp. 1957));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3501 to 22-3511 (1951)); Illinois (ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 §§ 820-835g (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958)); Indiana (IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-3401 to
9-3412 (Supp. 1959)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 225A.1-225A.15 (Supp. 1958)); Kansas
(KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1534 to 62-1537 (Supp. 1959)); Massachusetts (MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123A, § 1-11 (Supp. 1958)); Michigan (MiCH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.967(1)-28.967(9)
(1954)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09-526.11 (1957)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 202.700-202.770) (1949)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29.2901-29.2907 (Supp. 1957));
New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173:1-173:16 (1955)); New Jersey (N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 2:192-1.13 to 2:192-1.23 (Supp. 1951)); Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2947.242947.29 (Baldwin 1958)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 137.111-137.117 (1957)); Pennsylvania
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-1174 (1958)); South Dakota (S.D. CODE § 13.1727 (Supp.
1952)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1301 to 33-1305 (Supp. 1959)); Utah (UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-49-1 to 77-49-8 (1953)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2811-2816
(1958)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-278.2 to 53-278.4 (1950)); Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 71.06.010 to 71.06.260 (1957)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15 (West 1958));
Wyoming (WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-348 to 7362 (1956)).
116. Beth Keiko Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional Parametersfor Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 879, 880 (Spring 1992).
117. Swanson, supra note 107, at 215.
118. See Pennsylvania's statute (PA. STA. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (1958)) ("Mf any such
person... constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public.., the court...
may sentence such person to a state institution."); Tennessee's statute (TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-1301 (Supp. 1959)) ("['Sex offender' includes] any person ... who ... is likely to
attack or otherwise inflict injury, degradation, pain or other evil on the objects of his
uncontrollable desires.").
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twenty-seven statutes did not agree in the proper designation of his
condition. For example, some statutes labeled the defendant a "sexual
psychopath," "sexually dangerous person," or nothing at all.n
2. Basis of Jurisdiction. Amongst the twenty-seven statutes in
1960, there were three views as to what determined the basis for the
courts' jurisdiction over sexual psychopaths: Sixteen statutes provided
the offender must have been convicted of some crime or of a specific sex
crime before the court may determine whether to commit him for
treatment."H Seven statutes required the alleged offender be charged
with some crime, or a sex crime."' The remaining five statutes simply
demanded a showing of just cause that the defendant was probably a
sexual psychopath.12
3. Discretion in Initiating Proceedings. The majority of the
statutes in 1960 provided the state or district attorneys either may or
must initiate the sexual psychopath proceedings. Initiation depended
On the other hand,
upon the statute and basis of jurisdiction.'
California and Nebraska, for example, allowed anyone showing cause, or
the individual on his own behalf, to request a special hearing.' Many
1960 statutes provided if an alleged sexual psychopath was already on
trial for some crime, the trial judge could, using his discretion, retard
the proceedings at any point and order a mental examination and special
hearing for the defendant.'" Other statutes, however, either required
or allowed the judge to order such an examination and hearing only
upon the conviction of the offender.'w

119. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216. See generally Hacker & Frym, The Sexual
PsychopathAct in Practice: A CriticalDiscussion, 43 CAL. L. REV. 766 (1955).
120. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 n.10. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25
(Baldwin 1958) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 7749-1 (1953).
121. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 & n.11. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 822
(1959) and WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.020 (1957).
122. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 & n.12. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1957)
and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.2902 (Supp. 1957).
123. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 & n.13. See, eg., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173:3
(1955) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.25 (Baldwin 1958).
124. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 & n.14. See, e.g., CAL. WEL. & INSTNS. CODE
§ 5501 and NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.2902 (Supp. 1957).
125. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216 & n.15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 917.12(2)
(Supp. 1958).

126. Swanson, supra note 107, at 216-17 & n.16. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,

§ 1167 (1958) and VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.3 (1950).
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4. Medical Examination. Every sexual psychopath statute in 1960
contained a discretionary or mandatory provision for medical examination of the alleged sexual psychopath." Usually, the staff of a state
public health department or one or more "qualified" doctors examined
the individual and then reported their findings to the court for its use
in the disposition of the case.', Some statutes defined qualified, while
others did not. For example, Illinois defined qualified psychiatrist as a
reputable physician. He was licensed to practice in Illinois as a
specialist in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous
disorders for a period of not less than five years.'"
5. Proceedings. The statutes of 1960 consistently provided for a
hearing to determine whether an offender was a sexual psychopath.
However, the requirements varied from state to state. In many cases
that required a hearing, some or all of the following rights were granted:
(1) notice of hearing; (2) personal attendance at hearing, (3) counsel; (4)
habeas corpus; (5) bail; (6) presentation of evidence and subpoenaing of
witnesses; (7) cross-examination; and (8) appeal. 0 Courts would read
these rights into the statutes if they were not explicitly provided for in
the statutes. On the other hand, numerous statutes, like Tennessee's
and Utah's, simply required the judge, without a special hearing,
determine solely on the basis of medical reports whether the offender
should be committed for treatment." 1
If the qualified person determined the defendant was not a sexual
psychopath, he would be discharged, ordered to face criminal charges, or
required to serve out a sentence the criminal court already imposed upon
him. 3"' 2 On the other hand, if the qualified person determined the
defendant was a sexual psychopath, either he would be sent to a state
mental hospital to receive special treatment for an indeterminate
duration, or he was treated as an out-patient treatment.'3

127. Swanson, supra note 107, at 217.
128. Id. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1167 (1958) and VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.3
(1950).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, § 823.a (1959).
130. Swanson, supra note 107, at 217.
131. Id. at 218; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-1301-33-1305 (Supp. 1959) and UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 7749-1-7749-8 (1953).
132. Swanson, supra note 107, at 218.
133. Id. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.090 (1957) (a sexual psychopath was
committed in an institute until the superintendent determined the offender was "safe to
be at large .... *). See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:192-1.16 (Supp. 1951) (the court could
place the offender on probation, with the condition that the offender receive out-patient
psychiatric treatment prescribed in each individual case.).
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6. Release. The 1960 statutes required a hearing to consider
whether the sexual psychopath was no longer a menace to society. If
further treatment was necessary, then the offender would remain in the
institution. However, if the offender was found to have recovered
sufficiently, then the releasing authority could set the offender free,
place him on probation, or place him on parole.'
IV

CURRENT SOLUTIONS: RE-EXAMINING DANGEROUS SEXUAL

OFFENDER COMMITMENT LAWS
Throughout the 1980s state legislatures re-examined their dangerous
sexual offender commitment laws. Various factors together influenced
the trend by 1990, moving away from using dangerous sexual offender
commitment systems. These factors included the recognition that not all
violent sexual offenders were likely to respond to the same type of
therapy; the growing awareness that sex offenders were not mentally ill;
the lack of proven treatment methods to reduce recidivism rates; and the
rising concern for civil rights."
Beginning in the 1980s, numerous states repealed their dangerous
sexual offender commitment laws."" For example, California repealed
its sex offender legislation, declaring "[iln repealing the mentally
disordered sex offender commitment, the Legislature recognizes and
declares that the commission of sex offenses is not itself the product of
8 7 By 1990 approximately half of the states
mental diseases.""
had
their 1960s sexual psychopath procedures abolished.'
In addition,

134. Swanson, supra note 107, at 218-19. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 825c
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958) (in which offender no longer appeared to be sexually dangerous,
the offender could petition for a conditional release.) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-49-7 (1953)
(offender could be placed on probation, paroled, or pardoned when the superintendent
determined that the offender recovered sufficiently.).
135. Fujimoto, supra note 116, at 879; Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Violent
Sexual PredatorCommitment System: An UnconstitutionalLaw and An Unwise Policy
Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105 (Fall 1990).
136. Bodine, supra note 135, at 105.
137. Id. at (citing historical note to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6301 (1981)). See,
e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-A.1 (1977 & Supp. 1988) (repealed 1983).
138. Bodine, supra note 135, at n.27. Sexual offender commitment statutes still in
force: COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 16-13-201-216 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-238-257
(West 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3503-3511 (1981 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 105-1-12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123A §§ 1-11
(West 1986 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09-.11 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2911-2921 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1-7 (West 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 426.005-.300 (1985 & Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301-305 (1984 &
Supp. 1989); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 77-16-1-16-5 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 (Michie
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only five states have actively enforced the current laws in more than a
few isolated cases.' 9 Indeed, by 1990, the trend was to punish sex
offenders for their crime and to provide them with treatment in prison
on a voluntary basis.'
A

Washington State LegislatureBegins a New Trend

Every other state and the District of Columbia has a civil procedure
for committing persons as mentally ill.'
By 1990, after re-examination, a smaller group of states were left with a second civil procedure for
committing persons charged with sexual offenses as "sexual psychopaths;
such laws permitted states to treat sexual offenders in lieu of punishing
them."'42 In 1990, the Washington State Legislature revived involuntary civil commitment proceedings for a certain class of sex offenders--"exually violent predators." As a result of publicity related to a
trilogy of notoriously violent and cruel sexual crimes, the Washington
Legislature enacted its "Sexually Violent Predators Law" within its
"Community Protection Act."'
Washington's existing involuntary civil commitment system allows the
state to commit mentally ill persons for short-term, crisis-intervention
treatment.'" However, the civil commitment system is not designed
to provide long-term confinement of those who are not mentally ill.'
Many violent sexual offenders do not meet the existing involuntary
treatment act's requirement of mental illness and cannot be committed
under the act.' The inability to commit involuntarily violent sexual
offenders was seen as a "gap[0 in [the] law and administrative structures
[that] allow[0 the release of known dangerous offenders who are highly
likely to commit very serious crimes."" 7 The Governor's Task Force
on Community Protection proposed, and subsequently enacted, legisla-

1983); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.06.005-.270 (1975 & Supp. 1989). Id.
139. Id. at & n.27-28. E.g., Washington was among the states actively using the
violent sexual offender statutes. Washington limited its sexual psychopath law to sex
offenses committed before July 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (Supp. 1989).
140. Fujimoto, supra note 116, at 880.
141. Freedman, The Psychiatrist'sDilemma: Protectthe PublicorSafeguardIndividual
Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 255, 264 & n.70 (1988).
142. Id. at 264.
143. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
144. Id. § 71.06.005 (1975 & Supp. 1990).
145. See id. § 71.05.101 (Supp. 1989).
146. Id.
147. GOVERNORS TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND HEALTH SERVICES, FINAL REPORT at 11-20 (1989).
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Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
tion establishing
14
System. 8
1. Trilogy of Violent Sexual Crimes and Public Reaction. In
Seattle, Washington in September 1988, Gene Raymond Kane was on
leave through a state prison release program. At the time of this
release, Kane had served a full sentence of thirteen years for attacking
two women in 1975. Kane was not treated for his mental problems
while in prison because he was considered too dangerous to handle. He
was, nevertheless, released into the Seattle community.149 Diane
Ballasiotes' body was found a week after she left her job for the evening
and never returned. Kane had raped and killed Ballasiotes, then
dumped her body in another part of the city. Kane had been out of
prison for two months and was on leave when he killed Ballasiotes.' °
Ballasiotes' mother, Ida Ballasiotes, subsequently began a campaign to
enact legislation that would prevent or reduce the likelihood of violent
sex crimes by repeat sex offenders released into an unsuspecting
community.151 The response by the Washington legislature was
lukewarm.
In the same year, Washington experienced another violent attack by
a previous offender. Gary Minnix previously had been found incompetent to stand trial for sexual offenses. When Minnix was released, he
subsequently broke into a woman's apartment, raped her, and attacked
her with a knife in December 1988.152
It was not until the violent sexual attack on a seven-year-old boy,
however, that the initial lukewarm response by the Washington
legislature was dramatically kindled into a storm of community shock
and outrage. Earl K. Shriner kidnapped a seven-year-old boy who was
riding his bicycle near his Tacoma, Washington home. Shriner took the
boy into the woods, raped him, strangled him, and severed his penis.
Neighbors found the boy alive in the woods later that evening. Although
the boy was initially in shock, he later was able to give a description of
According to
Earl Shriner, a man known to the Tacoma police. 1
subsequent news articles in the Tacoma newspaper, Shriner had a
history of violent crimes. He killed a schoolmate when he was sixteen.

148.

Bodine, supra note 135, at 105.

149. See generally Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators": A Public Outcry in
Washington State Targeted Repeat Violent Sex Criminals. A New PreventiveLaw Would
Keep Them in JailIndefinitely, LA. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at A1-31.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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After his release from a mental institution, Shriner kidnapped and
assaulted two teenage girls. Shriner once told a prison cellmate he
wanted a van equipped with cages so he could capture children, sexually
abuse them, and then murder them.'
State correction officials attempted to commit Shriner for treatment
under Washington's Involuntary Treatment Act because they believed he
Shriner, however, could not be
posed a danger to the community.'
committed under the involuntary commitment act because he failed to
meet the two criteria necessary: Shriner was not mentally ill and he
had not performed any overt act during confinement for the assault on
the two girls demonstrating dangerousness to himself or others."
The Tacoma papers printed editorials responding to Shriner's criminal
history and the system's inadequacy to civilly commit Shriner for
indefinite period of time. One editorial stated:
This case makes clear that a class of criminal exists that is beyond
reach of rehabilitation because of mental deficiencies. Such people
cannot be put to death by a just society.
But justice also demands that society be protected from such people.
The legal system needs to be changed to make it possible to remove the
criminally insane from society, quickly and permanently. In such
obvious cases as this, the157law should err, if it errs at all on the side of
protecting the innocent.
Similar articles focused on the need to tighten Washington's laws in
order to avoid allowing offenders, like Shriner, from preying on victims
again and again.'"
Public concern continued to mount as the media relayed stories about
Shriner, the system's failure to protect the public from him, and the
seven-year-old's slow recovery. The public bombarded the Governor with
a campaign to enact tougher penalties for sex offenders. Protestors
gathered on the steps of the Capitol Building demanding the Governor
listen to the grass-roots campaign Ballasiotes initially brought in 1988.

154. Id. See generally Fujimoto, supra note 116; Bodine, supra note 135; Marie A.
Bochnewich, PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS AND WASHINGTON'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR STATUTE, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (Fall 1992); Gary Gleb, Washington'sSexually
Violent PredatorLaw: The Need to BarUnreliablePsychiatricPredictionsofDangerousness
From Civil Commitment Proceedings,39 UCLA L. REV. 213 (October 1991).
155. See generally Bochnewich, supra note 154. Gleb, supra note 154; David Boerner,
Confronting Violence: In The Act And In The World, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525
(Spring 1992).
156. See generally Bochnewich, supranote 154. Gleb, supra note 154; Boerner, supra
note 155, at 525.
157. Put MutilatorsAway, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Wednesday, May 24, 1989.
158. See Boerner, supra note 155.
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Thousands of letters and calls were received in the Governor's office
about Shriner and his seven-year-old victim. Public forums were held
about child sexual assault and proposed legislation." Indeed, Shriner's vicious crime finally galvanized the Washington legislature to enact
a new civil commitment system, the "Sexually Violent Predator Law," to
fill in the gaps that Washington's prior sex offender act was unable to
fll.

16 0

2. Provisions of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
System.
a. Definitions. Washington's new commitment system allows the
state to commit involuntarily those persons found to be "sexually violent
predators." The act defines a sexually violent predator as a person
charged with or convicted of a crime of sexual violence. Because of a
"mental abnormality or personality disorder," the sexually violent
predator is likely to commit crimes of sexual violence.161 "Predatory"
means acts directed towards strangers or individuals with whom a
relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose
of victimization phantom quote.162
The commitment process may be initiated if a person falls within one
of the following categories: (1) when the prison term of a person
convicted of a violent sexual offense nears expiration; (2) when a person
found to be incompetent to stand trial for a violent sexual offense is
about to be released; (3) when a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity of a violent sexual offense is about to be released; or (4) when
a person commits certain enumerated crimes with a sexual motivation.6

b. Discretion in initiatingproceedings. The commitment procedure
begins when the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general files a
petition alleging that the person is a "sexually violent predator."'
If
a judge finds that reasonable cause exists to support this allegation, the
judge may order the person transferred to an appropriate facility. There
an evaluation is performed to determine if the person's in fact a sexually

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra note 155.
WASH. REV.CODE ANN.§§ 71.09.101-.120 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
1190 WASH. LAWS ch.3, § 1002.
Id.
See Bodine, supra note 135, at 105; Bochnewich, supra note 154, at 277.
Id
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violent predator.'" The person may then be detained up to forty-five
days from the filing of the petition. Finally, a trial is held within the
forty-five days to determine whether the person is a sexually violent
predator.16
c.

Proceedings. At trial, the person is entitled to the right to

assistance of counsel and the right to demand a jury trial.'6 7 He also
has the right to retain experts or professionals to perform an examination on his behalf.'
The act, however, does not give the person the
right to remain silent or the right to refuse to be examined prior to the
trial. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person is a sexually violent predator.' 9
If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent
predator, the person will be committed indefinitely to the custody of the
state department of social and health services for control, care, and
treatment. 70 During this commitment, the sexually violent predator
has the right to care and treatment. Additionally, an examination of the
sexually violent predator's mental condition must be performed at least
once every year, and the court must receive periodic reports concerning
that mental condition. 17' The state detains the sexually violent
predator "until such time as the person's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at
large. 7
d. Release. Under Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System, a defined sexually violent predator may be released by one of
two methods. First, the Secretary of the State Department of Social and
Health Services may determine, if released, the sexually violent predator
is no longer likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence. The
sexually violent predator may then petition the court for his release,
which the court may grant only after a trial concerning the sexually
violent predator's probable dangerousness. 17 Before the trial, however, the state may request that the sexually violent predator undergo an
examination to determine if his mental abnormality or personality
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.

Id.
1d.

Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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disorder has changed so as to insure that he is no longer likely to
commit acts of sexual violence.174 Either the state or the sexually
violent predator may demand that the trial be held before a jury. The
court will deny the sexually violent predator's release if at the trial the
state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that he is likely again to
commit violent sexual offenses.17
Second, the sexually violent predator may obtain parole by petitioning
the court for the release over the secretary's objection. The sexually
violent predator may not petition the court for release, however, if he
has previously filed a petition over the secretary's objection. In addition,
if either (1) the petition was found to be frivolous, or (2) the sexually
violent predator's mental condition was found to be sufficiently
unchanged so that he could not be safely at large,17 the court must
refuse to hear a subsequent petition unless "the petition contains facts
upon which a court could find that the condition
of the petitioner had so
177
changed that a hearing [is] warranted."
e. Differences from dangerous sexual offender commitment systems.
The Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System differs from dangerous
sexual offender commitment systems of other states in one major aspect.
The dangerous sexual offender commitment systems allow the state to
commit the dangerous sexual offender in lieu of punishment. Washington's new Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System, however, allows
the state to commit involuntarily a person found to be a sexually violent
predator in addition to punishing him for the underlying offense."7 ,
This feature raises many constitutional criticisms.
3. Criticisms of "Dangerousness." In 1993, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System. 179 The state law's premise allowing individuals designated as
sexual predators to be committed for psychiatric treatment after they
have completed their prison sentence was constitutionally attacked. The
challenge to the law was brought by one four-time and one six-time
rapist. Similar to the constitutional arguments against dangerous
sexual offender commitment systems, the Violent Sexual Predator

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

i78. Id.
179. See B. Goldberg, Sexual Predators: Washington's Law Is Constitutional,79-Oct.
A.BA. J. 106 (October 1989).
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statute was challenged as violating double jeopardy, the ex post facto
clause, substantive due process guarantees of liberty, as well as
procedural aspects.' °
One of the most controversial and unique aspects to support the
constitutional arguments of the Sexually Violent Predator statute,
however, is the law's reliance upon a mental health professional's
prediction of the offender's future dangerousness.1 81 The opponents
claim that, because of their lack of accuracy, predictions of individual
recidivism is so low that it seriously threatens individual freedom and
autonomy without adequate justification.' 2 Thus, opponents have
argued that the statute violates substantive due process because
inaccurate prediction will render the detention merely preventive rather
than for treatment.'
Preventive detention without treatment is asserted then to be punitive
and thus the invasion of the offender's liberty interest is not justified by
In addition, the alleged offenders
the state's parens patriae power.'
who are not suffering from "mental abnormality" may be confined.
Critics of the scheme contend such over inclusiveness prevents the
statute from being sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve the state's
compelling interest in treating the offender and preventing him from reoffending.'85
In support of the Washington statute, it is argued that predictions of
dangerousness, in fact, are central to law enforcement and the judicial
system's mandate to control crime."' They are also considered key to
the mental health professions ability to contribute to the decision of who
be detained involuntarily due to mental disease or abnormalishould
87
ty.1

The support of preventive confinement finds force in the following:
"[Pireventive confinement of persons predicted to be dangerous has
'always been practiced, to some degree, by every society in history
regardless of the jurisprudential rhetoric it has employed.., it is likely
that some forms of preventive confinement will continue to be practiced
by every society.' "'

180. Id at 106.
181. See Bochnewich, supra note 154, at 277.

182. Id.
183.
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Alan Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Conftnement in Anglo.
American Law. PartI: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 57 (1974).
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In choosing to adopt the Sexually Violent Predator statute, Washington, proponents argue, chooses public safety from recidivists over the
individual liberty interests of the detainee. Thus, where the mental
disturbance of the individual accompanies the likelihood of further sex
crimes against others, indefinite commitment based upon expert
predictions of dangerousness seems to be the best solution.1 '
4.
Other States Make the Move for Civil Commitment. Washington's 1990 Sexually Violent Predator statute signals a
new era in anticrime measures. Recently, proposed legislation in various
states reflects the popular tough-on-crime movement sweeping the
nation and the focus on high-profile criminals. Repeat sex offenders
victimizing young women and children shortly after serving prison
sentences have become known celebrities in the states. As a result,
dozens of crime measures have been submitted in state legislatures, such
as Kansas, Alaska, California and Wisconsin."0
Indeed, sponsors of bills claim they are responding to a growing rate
of violent crime and a corresponding level of fear in the communities.
State legislatures model proposals after Washington's Sexually Violent
Predator statute, justifying the "sex predatory" laws as the only means
necessary to protect the public from dangerous criminals. Although the
proposals have meet the same unconstitutional, emotional and moral
arguments that faced Washington's statute, supporters contend
Washington's civil commitment statute survives. Therefore, giving
lawmakers the confidence that similar measures would withstand the
challenges in their states. 1
B. Applying Community Notification Laws
1. Washington State's Community Protection Act. Child
molester Joseph Gallardo's picture was distributed in Snohomish
County, Washington, after his release from prison. The notice featured

189. Id.
190. See Bill Targets Adults Who Don't Lock Up Guns, WiSC. STATE J., Jan. 2, 1994,
at 2C; Marilee Enge, Hanging Mood In Capitol Tough Crime Bills Given Good Chance,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al; Julie Wright, Family's Crusade Getting
Results Lawmakers Responding To Pleas, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 27, 1994, at la; Linda
Goldston, Law Aims To Trap Sexual Predators Molesters, Rapists Could Be Held
Indefinitely, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 17, 1994, at 1A; Julie Wright, PredatorBill
Sent To Finney Objections Can't Overcome FearOf Violent Sex Crimes, WICHITA EAGLE, at
1d; Julie Wright, Worst Sex Offenders CouldFaceLonger Confinement UnderBill, WICHITA
EAGLE, Mar. 27, 1994, at 12a.
191. Id.
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a long-haired, mustachioed Gallardo, with a description: "Viewed as an
extremely dangerous untreated sex offender with a very high probability
for re-offense... has sadistic and deviant sexual fantasies which include
torture, sexual assault, human sacrifice, bondage and the murder of
young children."'
Subsequently, residents of Gallardo's community
burnt his home down to prevent his return after an enforced thirtythree-month absence.
In 1991, Gallardo served time in prison for statutorily-raping a tenyear-old in 1986. He was a model prisoner. He did not, however, opt in
to a program for sex offenders. In addition, he drew alarming pornographic and violent pictures of children. Regardless, the sexually violent
predators provision of Washington's recent "Community Protection
Act"' did not apply to him. However, another clause mandates
community notice by the sheriff's department. Approximately thirtyeight states have registries for recently released sex offenders; the
offenders are required to notify police of their whereabouts wherever
they reside. However, Washington State's Community Protection Act
made sweeping changes in the law regarding sex offenders. In its
finding and policy statement for the act, the legislature stated that
... sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after
being released from incarceration or commitment and that protection
of the public from sex offenders is a paramount governmental interest
.... Therefore, this state's policy ... is to require the exchange of
relevant information about sexual predators among public agencies and
officials and to authorize the release of relevant information
about
1
sexual predators to members of the general public. 94
Indeed, the policy gave local law-enforcement officials a tool they had
never known before-the option to inform a community of a convicted
sex offender who would be living in their area. The Community
Protection Act does not contain specific provisions with respect to how
to notify the communities.195
2. "Megan's Law." On July 29, 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka
of Hamilton lbwnship, New Jersey was raped and killed by a neighbor.
The neighbor, Jesse Timmendequas, a convicted pedophile, allegedly
lured Megan into his house. He then sexually assaulted her and
strangled her to death with a belt. Timmendequas, a two-time child sex
192. David Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 58.
193. WAsH. REV. CODE § 71.09.120.
194. Robert Shilling, Guest Editorial 1990 Act Helps GuardAgainst Sex Offenders,
SEATrLE TIMES, July 22, 1993, at 2.
195. See WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 71.06.010-71.06.260.
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offender, lived in his house with two other convicted pedophile. Local
authorities had not informed the community of Timmendequas' release
or that Timmendequas and two other convicted child abusers had moved
into a home located across the street from Megan's house.'"
In the wake of public outrage over the recent slaying of Megan,
national attention in the summer of 1994 focused on the issue of the
release of sexual offenders and the rights of communities to notification
when the offenders move to or frequent their areas. 97 Representative
Richard A. Zimmer (R-Flemington) of New Jersey called for federal
legislation that would require mandatory notification to communities.
Known as Megan's law, it also requires convicted sex offenders report
their whereabouts regularly to state law-enforcement authorities for the
rest of the offenders' lives.'
Zimmer's proposal would also require
states to set up boards to "identify felons who are sexually violent
predators."'"
C. FederalAnti-Crime Bill
The $30 billion federal measure was approved 235-195 in the House
of Representatives on Sunday, August 21, 1994. It was expected and
subsequently approved by the Senate, and finally by the President.'
The approved legislation was a compromise of several amendments and
suggestions after lawmakers blocked the initial crime bill proposal on
August 11."' Representative Zimmer called the August 11 stipulations a "watered down" version of an earlier, tougher measure. The
earlier measure allowed full community notification and required
offenders to register their whereabouts every three months for their
entire lives or until judged to be no longer a risk.'

196. See generally James Popkin with Gareth G. Cook, Ted Gest, Joseph P. Shapiro &
Mike Tharp, NaturalBorn Predators,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 1994, at 6573.
197. Id.
198. See Marjorie Valburn, RepresentativeZimmer Urges CongressTo Support Federal
'Megan'sLaw' He Is Co.SponsoringLegislation To Inform Communities And Track Sex
Offenders For Life, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 9, 1994, at S03.
199.

Id.

200. For discussion on how federal bill's troubles were related to gun control issue see
House Approves Crime Bill, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at 1A, and Jennifer
Buksbaum, N.J. House Members Vote In FacorOf Crime Bill, 11-2, NEW JERSEY, Aug. 22,
1994, at al0.
201. See House Approves Crime Bill, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 22,1994, at 1A, Valbrun,
supra note 198, at S03.
202. Id.
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1. Registration and Community Notification. From its onset,
the purpose of the proposed federal legislation was to encourage states
to establish registration and tracking procedures and community
notification with respect to released sexually violent predators.' The
federal proposal was modeled in part by Washington State's laws,
recognized by lawmakers as leading the nation in coping with sex
offenders who terrorize playgrounds, parks, and neighborhoods and
deemed to prey on the most vulnerable in society. °4 Proponents
contended that the federal measure targets the violent sexual offenders
who are released into society after serving time for rape or child
molestation, despite the fact that they are a continued threat.' After
a determination has been made that the person is a sexually violent
predator, law enforcement officials can monitor the person's whereabouts
and warn communities where the person may prey.'
Indeed, lawmakers supported the federal legislation as giving law enforcement
officials the tools to perform their jobs protecting their communities from
the most violent and brutal criminals.
As passed, the 1994 anticrime federal legislation provides that people
who commit crimes against children, or sex offenses, must be registered
for 10 years, subject to annual verification."7 Defined sexually violent
predators would be subject to lifetime registration and quarterly
verification.'
More importantly, the federal bill provides that police
may notify communities of the presence of the registered offenders.'
2. Indefinite Civil Commitment. During Congressional hearings,
lawmakers recognized the model for the proposed federal legislation was
Washington State's laws, including its Sexually Violent Predators
Act. 21' The lawmakers acknowledged the inspirations for the passage
of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act, including the killer of
Tacoma's seven-year-old, Earl Shriner.21 In its original form, the
federal proposal provided for postincarceration, indefinite civil commitment of a small group of sexually violent predators. However, although

203. See generally supra notes 191-195.

204. Id.
205. I.
206. rd.
207. See H.R. REP. 103-711 (1994).

208. Id.
209. Id.

210. See generally supra notes 191-95.
211. Id. In their discussions for the federal legislation, lawmakers discussed Earl
Shriner's history and Washington State's move for stringent laws. Id.
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the Washington State Supreme Court recently upheld this provision and
several states have since copied Washington's Sexually Violent Predators
Act, the lawmakers found the involuntary civil commitment provision to
be "at the cutting edge" for federal law.212 The civil commitment
procedure troubled lawmakers, and ultimately the federal anticrime bill
fails to address this. Although Congressional records do not address the
exact reasons for deciding against civil commitment, it is understandable
when viewed in light of all the controversy surrounding the stringent
measure.
Civil libertarians continuously challenge the measure as unconstitutional---"fear[ingl that the drive to secure communities from predators
will trample civil rights and possibly hurt a great many innocent
people."2 1 Essentially, critics argue that civil commitment is lifetime
preventive detention masquerading as involuntary psychiatric treatment.
In Wisconsin, where a copycat law took effect in June, three state courts
recently ruled that the new civil commitment statute is unconstitutional,
violating the protection against double jeopardy.2 14 And, although the
state supreme courts in Washington and Minnesota upheld their civil
commitment laws as of the summer of 1994, the Supreme Court is
expected eventually to decide on the constitutionality of such measures.
3. "Scarlet Letter Laws." The practice of labeling a criminal with
symbols or words exposing the offense committed was used in colonial
America as a form of punishment by humiliation. 15 The method was
eventually deemed to be an archaic and unacceptable means of dealing
with antisocial behavior; the courts then sent criminals to correctional
institutions. 1 ' Today, faced with the reality of ineffective and overcrowded prisons and moral and constitutional arguments, a move has
been made to return to "scarlet letter laws" with the passage of the
federal crime bill. Critics named the provision encouraging community
notification as the scarlet letter law.217
Critics challenge the community notification provisions in state
statutes, and now federal law. Critics fear branding sexual offenders

212. Id.

213. U.S. NEWS & WORLD
214.

REPORT, supra note 196, at 68.
Id. Discusses various examples of whole communities attempting to keep serial

rapists and pedophiles from entering their neighborhoods. E.g. in Fairfax County, Virginia,
a mother passed out fliers to neighbors regarding a "child stalker and sexual assaulter"
seen with children. Id.
215. See generally Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced To Wear The Scarlet Letter: Judicial
InnovationsIn Sentencing-Are They Constitutional?93 DiCK. L. REv.759 (Summer, 1989).
216. Id.
217. U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, supra note 196, at 66.
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might actually do more harm than good. Branding would drive the
sexual offenders away from getting help and irretrievably harm released
offenders who are truly controlling their dangerous urges. In addition,
notifying communities may spark a kind of vigilantism. For example, in
Detroit, when rumors swept a community that a new resident was a
child molester, neighbors posted signs saying "School Kids! Watch Out"
and "Child Molester Lives Here." The man accused, however, denied
having molested children and was only convicted of gross indecency in
1975. Nevertheless, neighbors flooded his newly rented second-floor
apartment by stuffing tissues into his bathtub drain. Their efforts were
successful;218the man moved, and Detroit police say his whereabouts are
unknown.
D. Catalysts For PresentLegislation Are Reminiscent Of The Past
The catalysts for recent sexual offense legislation-reports of serious
crimes against women and children, sophisticated mass media, public
responses, grass-roots campaigns-stem from the post-Revolutionary
view that criminal law's purpose is to weigh individual liberty versus
crime control.219 Criminal law's purpose indeed is for the protection
of social order. The transformation that occurred in the post-Revolutionary era is reflective in the demand by the public and lawmakers to enact
what is deemed appropriate legislation to respond to the crimes of today.
Although the 1990s appear to further the post-Revolutionary view of
criminal law, the drive toward involuntary civil commitment appears to
further pre-Revolutionary objectives. Civil commitment laws allow
states to continue indefinitely incarcerating sexually violent predators.
Proponents contend that the commitment is to ultimately attempt to
integrate the offender more fully into society when he is released.
Indeed, whereas community notification laws reflect post-Revolutionary
law's attempt to protect society from the outcasts of society, civil
commitment's goal to reintegrate the sex offender so as to not be a
threat in the future reflects popular pre-Revolutionary opinion.
V. CONCLUSION

Changes occur in piecemeal fashion: legislators respond to practical
problems in an ad hoc and pragmatic fashion. As specific deficiencies in
the law become evident or new events arise, individual changes designed
to cure isolated problems are voted into law. The tremendous increase
in sex offenses coupled with the grave effects of sex crimes on the

218. Id. at 73.
219. See generally Nelson, supra note 11.
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victims of these offenses justify to the public renewed efforts by states
like Washington to craft new and drastic legislation-involuntary civil
commitment-to deal with this terrible social evil.'2 In the 1930s,
legislation was enacted to deal with a predominantly misunderstood
group known as sexual psychopaths.
In the 1990s, on the other hand, federal and state legislation responds
to the demands of the media, public, and grass-roots groups narrowly to
tailor legislation to address the cycle of fear caused by sexually violent
predators who slipped through the cracks of the legislation of the past.
Indeed, the 1994 election-year struggle over the federal anticrime bill
was part of the national outcry over the brutal crimes of sexual
offenders. The furor has led to some very tough solutions on both the
state and federal levels.
RAQUEL BLACHER

220. See generally supra note 149.

